Optionalities in the Electricity Market: The Case of Cross-Border Capacity Rights

ETH Practitioner Seminar in Financial and Insurance Mathematics

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Outline

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Peculiarities of the Energy market I

Depending on the ability to store the commodity and the corresponding costs, time series of energy prices may show the following

- **Seasonality** of prices (hours/weekdays/months), depending on the exact delivery period
- **Connection between forward price** f_t^T observed at time t with delivery at T and **spot price** $S_t = f_t^t$ **different to equity markets** because cash-and-carry transactions are costly (e.g. storage costs) or not possible. Hence $f_t^T e^{r(T-t)} S_t$ does not hold in general.
- prices can get **negative**
- **Spikes** (rapid upward movements followed by downward movements of the same order of magnitude) in spot prices
- Jumps in forward prices (up or down)
- **Mean reversion** of spot prices
- Samuleson (1965) effect (historical/implied **volatility is decreasing with time to maturity**)

Peculiarities of the Energy market II

- **Cointegration** of Spot prices across markets of the same commodity/ across commodities
- **Correlations** across commodities **increase with maturity** (e.g. correlation between gas and power for the forward products delivering next month is lower than the correlation between gas and power for the forward products delivering in 2020)

Example of Markets I

Coal API2

- No or only weak seasonal behaviour, no spikes
- Delivery location: Rotterdam (NLD)
- illiquid
- Financial swaps traded OTC and Futures/options on ICE (London)

Oil Brent crude oil

- No or only weak seasonal behaviour, no spikes
- From the North sea
- Futures/options traded on ICE (London)

Electricity German Baseload

- not storable
- Hourly spot prices exhibit mean reversion, seasonality and spikes
- Delivery happens during a time period rather than at a time point
- Forwards/options traded OTC and Futures at EEX (European Energy Exchange in Leipzig)

Example of Markets II

atural Gas TTF (Dutch Gas)

- partly storable
- Spot prices exhibit mean reversion, seasonality and spikes, but less than electricity
- Delivery happens during a time period rather than at a time point
- Forwards/options traded OTC and Futures at ICE/EEX

Overview electricity market



Figure: Illustration of the main players in the Electricity market. Based on Cornlusse (2014)

Outline

Introduction I

- Electricity in the wholesale market is delivered over a **time period** at a **specified place** (called 'balancing group') with a **specified power** expressed in Megawatt (MW). This makes it different to the stock or the interest market for instance, where stocks and payments are exchanged at certain particular time points and not during a period. Finally, the price is quoted in terms of MWh, e.g. if we exchange 4 MW during 5 hours, we have exchanged 20 MWh of energy.
- Balancing groups are grouped together to 'grid zones', for which an entity called TSO (Transmission system operator) needs to make sure that electricity **production** is at any time **equal** to electricity **consumption** (according to Kirchhoff's circuit laws). In order to ensure this, the TSO needs to have the possibility to increase/decrease consumption/production (and the opposite) at any time to ensure a balanced grid.

Introduction II

- Grid zones are connected via Transmission lines with certain **capacities**.
- We can mainly distinguish two markets (leaving aside the very short term markets): **Spot** markets and **forward** markets. Typically, on the spot market, hourly blocks of power delivered on the following day are auctioned. In the forward market, electricity delivered during blocks of days, weekends, weeks, months, quarters or years are traded.
- The spot market is organized for **auctions** for every hour in every gridzone: Every participant can enter constrained bids or offers (like: participant A is willing to sell tomorrow in the hour from 06:00 to 07:00 in Germany 20 MW for a price above 30 EUR/MWh, 15 MW for a price between 20 and 30 EUR/MWh and 10 MW below a price of 20 EUR/MWh). The auction organizer (an exchange) will aggregate the Bids and Offers and calculate the **equilibrium price where demand meets supply**.

Introduction III

- The forward market is organized **OTC** (over the counter) (where usually physically delivered forwards or financially settled swaps are traded) **and at exchanges** (where usually financially settled futures are traded).
- Absence of arbitrage requires that at time t the **forward price** $F_t^{T_1,T_2}$ for a product delivering in the interval $[T_1,T_2]$ with $T_2 > T_1 > t$ is **equal to expectation of the average spot price** during that period under the pricing measure $\mathbb{Q}$:

$$F_t^{T_1,T_2} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}\left[\frac{1}{T_2-T_1}\int_{T_1}^{T_2} S_u du \,|\, \mathscr{F}_t\right],$$

  where we denote by S_t the (not observable) instantaneous price of electricity delivered in time t.

Hourly spot auction: illustration



Figure: Electricity Demand and Supply Curves in France 16:00-17:00 on November 3, 2016. Source: www.epexspot.com

Historical hourly Spot prices of French electricity: first impression



Figure: hourly Spot prices for France. Datasource: EpexSpot

Historical Spot prices of France: A better impression



Figure: Daily and weekly averaged Spot prices for France. Datasource: EpexSpot

Historical Spot prices of France: within-year seasonality

Figure: Weekly averaged spot prices for France for different years. Datasource: EpexSpot

Historical Spot prices of France: weekday/weekend seasonality



Figure: Daily averaged spot prices for France. Datasource: EpexSpot

Historical Spot prices of France: within-week seasonality



Figure: Hourly spot prices of France for two Weeks. Datasource: EpexSpot

Outline

Structural models I

- Structural or **fundamental** models model the economic variables which affect the formation of the electricity price.
- Usually these variables will either have an impact on the supply or the demand of electricity.
- On the production side usually the **merit-order-curve** is modelled, which 'ranks' different production technologies according to their marginal short run costs. Potential variables to model are **fuel prices** which affect the marginal costs of gas or coal-fired-power plants or **unexpected outages** of power plants or **subsidies** for green energy which will foster long term building of wind or solar power plants.
- On the demand side short term factors like **wind strength**, **temperatures** or **economic output growth** are variables which can be considered.
- By simulating these variables, market clearing prices are calculated, which finally will lead to a series of spot prices.

Structural models II

- These models are often not tractable such that they **can hardly be calibrated** to market data.
- They are often used for **scenario analysis** to estimate the impact of a change in an external variables.
- Examples of these models are from Barlow (2002) or Carmona *et al.* (2013).



Figure: Merit Order. Source: EIA

Example of France forwards I

- On the **end of September 2016**, EDF (the French utility) communicated that some of their nuclear power plants have to go into **extended maintenance**. 21 of the 58 plants in France are offline. Therefore it was expected that supply will be limited
- On the **end of October 2016**, meteorologists forecasted **low temperatures** for the week beginning on November 07 2016. Since heating with electricity is common in France, a high demand in that week was expected.

Example of France forwards II



Figure: Weekly and Monthly forward prices for France delivering in November 2016. Datasource: EEX

One simple model: Barlow (2002) I

The model of Barlow (2002) is a very simple model which directly models the electricity demand X_t by a standard **Ornstein-Uhlenbeck** process (demand is mean reverting because the weather is mean reverting) and not dependent on any price because **demand is inelastic**

$$dX_t = -\lambda \left(X_t - \bar{x}\right) dt + \sigma dW_t$$

Marginal short run costs (supply curve) are given by the function $f_\alpha\left(X_t\right)$:

$$f_\alpha\left(X_t\right) = \begin{cases} \left(1+\alpha X_t\right)^{1/\alpha} & \text{if } \alpha \neq 0 \\ e^{X_t} & \text{if } \alpha = 0 \end{cases}$$

The level of α sets the elasticity of electricity supply.
The final spot price S_t is given by the market clearing price where demand meets supply. However, a maximum threshold is set (which

One simple model: Barlow (2002) II

can be justified since spot markets usually really have an upper threshold price).

$$S(t) = \begin{cases} f_{\alpha}(X_t) & \text{if } 1+\alpha X_t > \varepsilon_0 \\ \varepsilon_0^{1/\alpha} & \text{if } 1+\alpha X_t \leqslant \varepsilon_0 \end{cases}$$

Spot factor models I

Spot factor models explain the evolution of spot prices by several factors. Meyer-Brandis & Tankov (2008) for example use **two mean-reverting factors**

$$
\begin{aligned}
S_t &= e^{\Lambda_t} \cdot \left(Y_t^1 + Y_t^2\right) \\
dY_t^1 &= -\frac{1}{\lambda_1} Y_t^1 dt + \sigma dW_t \\
dY_t^2 &= -\frac{1}{\lambda_2} Y_t^2 dt + dL_t \\
L_t &= \sum_{i=1}^{N_t} D_i
\end{aligned}
$$

where L_t is a **compound Poisson** process where the jump sizes D_i are **Pareto distributed**, $\lambda_1, \lambda_2 > 0$ and Λ_t represents a deterministic seasonality.

Note that authors (for example Koekebakker & Ollmar (2005)) who performed a PCA analysis on electricity price data concluded that

Spot factor models II

many factors (> 3) are required to explain a reasonable fraction of the variation in electricity prices. This is more than in other markets.

Plot of Forwardprices



Figure: History of Futures prices of French Baseload Power. DataSource: EEX

HPFC I

Every market player has its own **hourly price forward curve** (HPFC) for each market, which is used to price linear electricity products of any kind delivering in any hour. An HPFC is **arbitrage free with respect to products traded in the market** (the weekly, monthly, quarterly, yearly average of the hourly prices equals the corresponding price of the traded observable contracts) and usually makes use of **seasonality** and **holiday information** and **smoothing** considerations. See for example Benth *et al.* (2013, chapter 7) for one method to create such a curve.

However note that there are infinitely many different HPFCs which are consistent with the observable market prices- because the **market is not complete**.

HPFC II



Figure: Sample daily forward curve and market inputs (shifted)

HJM-style models I

Similar as in the interest rate world, models in the spirit of Heath *et al.* (1992) are applied, where **forward prices are modelled directly**.
Usually, they use the given HPFC as a starting point - in which price information about seasonality etc. is already contained and hence the model will not need to take care about this.
Often the models are based on

$$\frac{dF_t^{T_1,T_2}}{F_t^{T_1,T_2}} = \sum_{k=1}^{m} \sigma_k(t, T_1, T_2)\, dW_t^k$$

where $F_t^{T_1,T_2}$ is the forward price at time t for the electricity delivery during period $[T_1, T_2]$ with $T_2 > T_1 > t$ and m represents the number of factors considered.

HJM-style models II

An examples of these models is Kiesel *et al.* (2009), where **monthly** futures/forwards with delivery during monthly periods (l denotes the length of a month) have the folllowing SDE:

$$\frac{dF_t^{T_1,T_1+l}}{F_t^{T_1,T_1+l}} = e^{-\kappa(T_1-t)}\sigma_1 dW_t^1 + \sigma_2 dW_t^2$$

Futures of periods of quarterly and yearly length are **approximated** using a basket volatility approximation formula. In this model, the volatility of the long end of the curve approaches σ_2 while the short end of the curve is increasingly driven by the first factor.
Another model of this class is Bjerksund *et al.* (2010) who use a different approximation. Also other models evolved in the meantime with more general factors (for example based on **Levy processes**).

Outline

The product I

- **Transmission line capacities** between neighbouring markets are **auctioned**. There exist day ahead, month ahead and year ahead auctions for transmission of electricity of most of the neighbouring markets- see `http://www.jao.eu`.
- If one owns such a transmission right to transport electricity from market / grid zone A to market / grid zone B, then -depending on the specific boarder- one either
  - has the right to move electricity **physically** across grid zones **or**
  - **owns a financial product** which pays in each hour h $max\left(S_h^A - S_h^B, 0\right)$, where S_h^A is the spot price of hour h in market A and S_h^B is the spot price of hour h in market B.

The product II

- The **physical** transmission would be financially equal to the financial product if one would be able to transact at the spot prices of the two markets at the time when the transmission right has to be nominated to the TSO. This is however not the case since **nomination of transmission rights has to be done some hours before the spot auction is taking place**. Additionally, in order to benefit from the price differential of the two markets, one would need to participate in the auction of which one does not know the outcome in advance. Therefore, the payoff of the physical transmission right in hour h is equal to $\max\left(\mathbb{E}\left[S_h^A - S_h^B \,|\, \mathscr{F}_{h-d}\right], 0\right)$, where we denote by d **time differential** between nomination of the boarder and the publication of the spot prices S_h^A and S_h^B.

The product III

- In Europe the settlement is only done financially if the markets are part of the so called **market coupling mechanism**. In this case, the spot prices across the neighbouring countries are determined at the same time while taking into account the capacity of the x-border lines. This ensures that energy only flows from market A to market B if the spot price in market B is higher than the spot price in market A, which avoids inefficiencies and increases economic welfare.
- Since physical transmission has to be nominated before the spot price is published, inefficiencies might arise.
- Note that the payoff indicates that the product is financially equal to a strip of hourly spread options- where each hour of the delivery period can be executed independently.

Illustration of Market Coupling I



Figure: Market Coupling without Congestion (source Adamec *et al.* (2009))

If the capacity of the transmission line is **large enough**, the spot prices of market A and B are **equal**.

Illustration of Market Coupling II



Figure: Market Coupling with Congestion (source Adamec *et al.* (2009))

If the capacity of the transmission line is large enough, then the **importing market** has a **higher price** than **the exporting market**.



Figure: Flows on 8th of November 2016 from 18.00-19.00. Source: EpexSpot

Intrinsic Value I

Practitioners like to split up the value of flexible products / products with optionalities into an **intrinsic** and a **extrinsic** part. For the intrinsic part, two different definitions are common:

- The value that will result **if the current HPFC** will realize in the spot market, so $S_T = f_t^T$.
- The value that **can be locked in today** by trading the underlying today.

The **extrinsic part** is the **residual** of what is left in order to get the total value. In a standard option setting, it would also be called time value. If we denote at time t the value of a call expiring at time T by C_t, then $\max(S_t - K, 0)$ is the intrinsic value and $C_t - \max(S_t - K, 0)$ is the extrinsic value.
Are the two definitions of the intrinsic value different (neglecting transaction costs)? In a complete market setting, where the price of the underlying is observable and traded, it is equal. But a yearly transmission right is composed of 8760 independent options, which

Intrinsic Value II

have in total 2×8760 different underlying contracts. They are clearly not traded.

Hence, if one uses the first definition then the intrinsic value is different across market participants (since they all have different HPFC models) and cannot be realized immediately- it's prone to model misspecification.

Table: Belgium and French electricity futures settlement price on the day of auction (2015-12-09) and resulting intrinsic value compared to actual auction price outcome (in EUR/MWh). Datasources: JAO, EEX and ICEEndex

	BEL	FRA	Spread	FRA to BEL	BEL to FRA	days
Jan	38.70	38.09	0.61	0.61	0	31
Feb	40.70	41.27	-0.57	0	0.57	29
Mar	35.95	37.08	-1.13	0	1.13	31
Q2	30.60	30.50	0.1	0.1	0	91
Q3	30.35	29.69	0.66	0.66	0	92
Q4	37.90	38.35	-0.45	0	0.45	92
Full year	34.31	34.32	0.01	0.24	0.25	366
Auction				0.96	1.25	
Extrinsic				0.72	1.00	

Valuation according to Wobben *et al.* (2012) I

Wobben *et al.* (2012) suggest three models for valuation of physical transmission rights. First they deseasonalize the data and then fit the residual by considering the combinations of

- modelling the **spot price spreads directly** vs. the **individual spot prices in the two markets**
- using **only mean-reverting diffusion processes** vs. **including jumps**, which are independent in case of the two markets

They conclude that a setting with a correlated diffusion processes for the two prices including jumps is the most realistic case and also claim that the prices paid at the auctions are too low.
However, as they also note themselves, **physical** transmission rights are *"“in fact [...] options on the expected spot prices, because nomination takes place 4 hours before day-ahead market clearing"”*.
Nevertheless they fit their models to realized spot prices as if the product would be a financial transmission right, which potentially leads to an overvaluation.

Margrabe (1978) formula I

Note that a call on the spread $S^t_{A,T} - S_{B,T}$ with strike K is exactly the same as a put on the spread $S^t_{B,T} - S_{A,T}$ with strike $-K$.
The simplest approach to price a spread option with a 0 strike is given by the Margrabe (1978) formula. It uses the hourly prices of the HPFCs for the two markets A, B as a starting point and then assumes that the spot prices in both markets are multivariate log normal distributed. This formula **naturally follows in a diffusion HJM-framework**. Then, at time t the price of a call option C^T_t on the spread $S^t_{A,T} - S_{B,T}$ is given by

$$C^T_t = e^{-r(T-t)} \left(F^T_{A,t} \cdot N(d_1) - F^T_{B,t} \cdot N(d_2) \right)$$

$$d_1 = \frac{\log\left(\frac{F^T_{A,t}}{F^T_{B,t}}\right) + \frac{1}{2}(T-t) \cdot \tilde{\sigma}^2(t,T)}{\sqrt{T-t} \cdot \tilde{\sigma}(t,T)}, d_2 = \frac{\log\left(\frac{F^T_{A,t}}{F^T_{B,t}}\right) - \frac{1}{2}(T-t) \cdot \tilde{\sigma}^2(t,T)}{\sqrt{T-t} \cdot \tilde{\sigma}(t,T)},$$

$$\tilde{\sigma}(t,T) = \sqrt{\sigma^2_A(t,T) + \sigma^2_B(t,T) - 2\sigma_A(t,T) \cdot \sigma_B(t,T)\, \rho_{A,B}(t,T)}$$

Margrabe (1978) formula II

where $F^T_{A,t}$ and $F^T_{B,t}$ are the forward price of market A and B for a delivery in time T as observed at time t, $\sigma_A(t,T)$ and $\sigma_B(t,T)$ the annualized volatility of $\log\left(\frac{S_{A,T}}{F^T_{A,t}}\right)$ and $\log\left(\frac{S_{B,T}}{F^T_{A,t}}\right)$,respectively and $\rho_{A,B}(t,T)$ the corresponding correlation. Usually the two volatilities are decreasing and correlation is increasing with time to maturity $T-t$.

Note that this formula is not justified by a replication argument, because the market is not complete since the two underlying products cannot be traded.

Anyway, a **multivariate lognormal distribution seems to be not justified** when one plots the hourly prices of two neighbouring markets against each other.

Margrabe (1978) formula III



Figure: hourly spot prices of the first 6000 hours of the year 2015 of France, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany plotted against each other. The red line indicates the line of equal prices on both markets. Datasource:EpexSpot

Margrabe (1978) formula IV



Figure: Histogram of hourly spot price spread Belgium - France of the first 6000 hours in the year 2015. Datasource:EpexSpot

Regime BEL between FRA and NLD



Figure: Daily averaged spot prices for France, Belgium and Netherlands on the beginning of 2015. Datasource:EpexSpot

Regime NLD decoupled, FRA and BEL spiky



Figure: Daily averaged spot prices for France, Belgium and Netherlands on the end 2016. Datasource:EpexSpot

Structural models

- Mahringer *et al.* (2015) suggest a **fundamental/structural** model for the spot prices in the two markets by randomizing fuel costs and the demand in the two markets. They then present a closed form solution for the valuation of transmission right. However, no calibration to actual data is performed.
- Kiesel & Kustermann (2015) extend the fundamental model of Carmona *et al.* (2013) to two markets with market coupling. However, they focus on studying the impact of market coupling on futures prices, but do not use their model to value transmission capacity rights.

Possibilities for further research

The literature on this topic is relatively new and there is no standard model yet applied. A reasonable model should have

- is **in line with market traded forward prices**
- is able to reproduce the histogram of spreads of spot prices as observed
- takes into account that there can be **regime switches** as in the Belgium market
- can be calibrated to and with historical **market data**

Outline

Other products with optionalities

In the energy market, a lot of real options are implicitly traded, either when investing in an asset or in a financial products like so called VPP (virtual power plants). The problem that has to be solved for most of these products is **path dependent** and therefore the industry standard valuation tool is the Longstaff & Schwartz (2001) approach, also known as *Least Square Monte Carlo* or *American Monte Carlo*.

Examples of these products are

- **flexible Gas fired power plants**: Essentially a path dependent option on the **clean spark spread**, the spread between the electricity price on one side and on the gas and CO2 certificates price on the other side.
- **Hydro storage**: Option on time spreads (spread of forwards with different maturities), spikes and seasonality of the electricity prices.
- **Gas storages**: Options on time spreads and spikes of the gas market.
- **Swing contracts**: Options to choose the time of delivery within a given period.

Outline

Conclusion

- We have discussed statistical properties of electricity spot and forward prices and approaches how to model them
- We have discussed existing models for cross-border transmission right valuations, which basically boil down to **valuing a spread option**. However, so far there are no reduced form models available which are capable to reproduce price spreads as observed. Especially the existing reduced form models do not reproduce the large frequency at which spot prices are equal for neighbouring markets. Additionally, they do not account for the regime switches that can be observed

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